Fade in: The Greene Science Center at Columbia University. A slightly disheveled beverage purveyor, in newly-purchased pants, is about to address a collected panel.

Beerguyrob: Esteemed professors, fellow Ph.D candidates, gathered audience members, ladies & gentlemen, and – for some reason – Arthur Laffer,

Thank you for your time today. My presentation this afternoon will be on the topic of The Law of Diminishing Returns as it relates to the NFL salary cap, and a Buridan’s ass exploration into the enjoyability ratio of a team unable to free itself from a cycle of decline while having to spend exorbitant sums to avoid faster decline. I anticipate a fifteen minute presentation, with photographic & representational examples to make my point, at which time I will conclude and invite your queries.

Invigilator: Very well; you may proceed.

BGR: The Atlanta Falcons…

Invigilator: I will please remind the audience that this is an academic forum, and that, while unpopular, Mr. Beerguy’s topic is nonetheless worthy of presentation due to its ongoing nature & epitomization of the inequity of economic strictures to allow for promotion within organized sport. If you cannot contain your emotions, I’m afraid that I will have no choice but to clear this auditorium. Is that understood?

A silent murmur of acknowledgement rustles through the crowd.

Thank you. Mr. Beerguy, will you please continue?

BGR: Thank you, sir.

By the sounds coming from behind me, I gather most observers are familiar with the team and its recent history. As such, I will first direct you to the most recent high point of success for this franchise, a date we all recognize as February 5, 2017, approximately 8:43 PM Eastern time. Some of you may recognize it from this image – first slide please.

BGR: (to invigilator) Sir?

Invigilator: No, I’m going to allow that one. I lost $400 on that game.

(Three minutes later)

Invigilator: Well, that was cathartic. Now Mr. Beerguy, I will not be allowing that interruption to impact your time. You still have a full 14 minutes for your presentation.

BGR: (under breath) Dammit. There goes my shortcut.

Well, as I was saying, the highpoint for this franchise was a 28-3 lead in Super Bowl LI. I have prepared/stolen a small video package that highlights in short order how a seemingly professional sports organization that turn an apparent victory into humiliating defeat within a span of 20 minutes. If the A/V student in the back could push “play”?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2ulyJuvU3Q

WRONG VIDEO, GUNTHER!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kx0ZT2p8apI

As you can see, the on-field architect of this demise was a man named Matt Ryan. He plays a position called “quarterback”, and is generally considered the most efficient & valuable member of the team, which is why they earn, according to the NFL’s salary cap, the most money of any position player on a NFL team. Slide 2 please?

Now, the data is from 2014, but the accuracy of the scale is still on par with 2020. You will note that the position of quarterback, labeled “QB” on the pie chart, accounts for only 10% of an average salary cap, whereas a position like offensive lineman, or “OL” occupies 18% of the total.

At this stage, I will direct you to this photo of an average football offensive formation. Slide three, please.

In this photo, you will see six helmets – five of those are offensive linemen, and the sixth is the quarterback Matt Ryan. Matt Ryan is scheduled to earn $18,962,500 against the salary cap this year, or 9.39% of the team’s total available space. The total commitment to the offensive line, including reserve players, adding up to nine total OL players is $44.1 million, or 23% of the total team cap. You will note in the chart above that the league average for offensive line spending is 18% of the available salary cap. A 5% overage such as this will expose shortcomings in other parts of the lineup, leading to spending deficits at other positions. This is usually most apparent on defence, as the Falcons recently & routinely have given up far more points than they themselves score. By alloting so much money to one person or grouping, the team has prevented themselves from being able to grow at other positions, and instead must fill offensive holes with cheap alternatives. Slide four?

Invigilator: Sir, I’ll remind you to leave the cheap digs to the community college attendees at Barstool.

BGR: Of course. Apologies.

Now, in the last three years, since Super Bowl LI, the Atlanta Falcons have paid Matt Ryan almost $95 million in salary. For their expenditure, they have finished with records of 10-6 (2017), 7-9 (2018), and 7-9 (2019). In short, for almost a hundred million dollars, their return on the investment has been a second-place finish & two Jeff Fishers, hardly a paragon of success.

Invigilator: Excuse me. For the unenlightened, what is a “Jeff Fisher”?

BGR: I’m sorry. A “Jeff Fisher” is a colloquial term among NFL fans for a coach that is seemingly able to continually hold down a top job while simultaneously being unable to achieve a record of .500 in that chosen field. They are a marketable name brand that is unable to achieve mediocrity within the profession, despite numerous, unwarranted opportunities to do so. It seemingly holds back the franchise’s progress one year for each year the team employed him.

Invigilator: Thank you.

BGR: Actually, this is a perfect transition into my main topic.

As you can see from this chart – slide five, please – the Law of Diminishing Returns

holds that once you have achieved the most productive of heights, continued investment in attempting to maintain that position will invariably weaken the organization, especially if they only have a finite amount of resources able to dedicate to that pursuit. The NFL salary cap prevents teams from being able to throw ultimate resources at a problem, in the belief that “parity” is the ultimate enabler in helping all 32 franchises maintain competitive balance.

Invigilator: But what about the Cleveland Browns?

BGR: Who am I, God? No one can answer that question. Maybe ask him to talk to his boy, Lucifer.

To recap, the Atlanta Falcons achieved their most productive point on February 5, 2017, at 8:43 PM, as you can see from this next slide…

It was at that exact moment the braintrust behind their rise to pseudo-prominence

decided to depart from the established blueprint that got them there and instead chose a different approach which they hoped would ease their way to victory. However, the end result of their deviation from their established strategy was to allow a hungrier competitor to rise up and overcome the blueprint that had rendered them ineffective. The Falcons then became captured by the phenomenon known as “Analysis paralysis“, and attempts to return to the successful strategy were ineffective as the team was forced to instead try and, to use another colloquialism, “stop the bleeding”. Their “perfect plan” was, in effect, the enemy of an actual “good plan”. Thus, their seemingly insurmountable lead quickly evaporated within 19 minutes of effective game time – slide eight please –

and resulted in the need for extra time to be introduced to provide a winner. Using the ancient Roman act of navia aut caput, and the allegorical foundation of “tails never fails”, the opposing team were able to control the gameplay and obtain the necessary points to prevent the Falcons from taking the field to achieve numerical symmetry. By this point, in allowing the game to progress to overtime, the Falcons had already crossed into the realm of negative returns, as you will see in slide nine,

especially since the result of the game was no longer in question. Ever since, the Falcons have attempted to return to both this time and place, despite the principle that “Equality of opportunities is unequal”.

Their commitment to retaining the services of Mr. Ryan is emblematic of the “Theory of Reasoned Action“. Their desire to not drop below an expected standard – the “.500 mark” where wins & losses become equal on an overall record – in order to maintain & retain fan loyalty, has forced them to tailor the organizational on-field structure to suit his abilities. This has resulted in a deeper economic investment in not just his position but others that he is reliant upon to ensure his, but not the team’s, continued success. It is a classic “Morton’s Fork” scenario, wherein the team has the ability to make the changes it needs to succeed, but chooses to make the changes the talent – but not the team – needs to succeed.

I give you the example of Julio Jones – slide 10?

Mr Jones – (turns around quickly) IF I HEAR ONE PERSON START HUMMING THAT FUCKING SONG…

– now, Mr. Jones is considered the pre-eminent “wide receiver” of 2018, and is in fact on pace to earn more money in 2020 than Mr. Ryan. Mr. Jones is scheduled to earn $22 million dollars for the 2020 season, the final year of his contract, a full 10.11% of the team’s salary cap. In total, for both Matt Ryan & Julio Jones, the Atlanta Falcons have devoted a combined 19.5% of their salary cap. In addition, the team has $17,483,178 in dead-cap money – funds committed to players no longer with the team. That is 8.66% of their overall available spending unable to be used because it is lost money. Combined with Messers Jones & Ryan, that is over 28% of their salary cap, up to 33% if you include all their wide receivers into the salary mix, and is a classic sport-related example of diminishing returns as a result of the “sunk cost fallacy“, as the need to hold on to key players to try & replicate past success invariably leads to structural organizational failure and a greater period of time required to rebuild the organization up from that failure.

The head coach, Dan Quinn, has been the primary architect of the team’s recent successes. But as the years have progressed from that initial championship appearance, attempts to repeat those heights have fallen by the wayside due to the desire to repeat success with current staff, whereas competitors have progressed beyond their inadequate rosters and been open to diversification. He was hoping to exploit the positive effects of the “experience curve“. However, reliance on one mode of operation – Matt Ryan – has caused the team to become stagnant, resulting in their being passed by younger, more adaptable competitors. His failure to institute a continuous improvement process has led the team to a harsh economic reality, because the amount of money they have committed to the 2021 salary cap is $45 million over what the projected, non-COVID cap will be. This will take them beyond a sunk-cost evaluation and force them into a liquidation of assets in order to meet the legal economic standard the league expects all teams to operate under. In other words, their economic standing after this season is – slide twelve,

a tire fire.

This inequity has created a “diseconomy of scale“, in which the team is forced to find cheaper alternatives in order to meet minimum requirements for attempting to achieve success. When combined with the Law of Diminishing Returns, you have a recipe for a continued spiral into unsustainability. This will make attaining even a “Jeff Fisher” a functional impracticality; at best, they may be able to achieve a “David Shula“. Slide 11, please?

Invigilator: Do I even want to ask what a “David Shula” is?

BGR: No sir. Just accept that it’s equal parts nepotism and incompetence in human form.

Now, the one competitive advantage the Falcons will have during the 2020 season has only an ancillary point towards economics. In 2015, the Falcons were caught amplifying the crowd noise in their stadium, in attempts to gain a competitive advantage. At the time, the NFL fined the Falcons $350,000 and the franchise lost their fifth-round selection in the 2016 NFL Draft. However, this year fans will not be permitted to attend games, due to COVID-19 restrictions…

Invigilator: I will ask the QAnon & Ayn Rand representatives to restrain themselves. This is not a free speech zone.

BGR: (ignoring it all) …allowing the teams to decide on their own appropriate home-field volume advantage. I grant they are not as expert as the New England Patriots in terms of cheating, but…

(A voice rises from the murky deep, which is awkward because it’s the ninth floor…)

Hippo: ENOUGH TALK, BEERGUY! What’s your prediction for their season.

BGR: Hippo?! What are you doing here?

Hippo: I’m the current Knight-Bagehot Fellow here at Columbia. All I have to do is type up my notes on your fucking screed here and I’ve got my Master of Arts in Journalism. SUCK ON THAT, VICHY-DEADSPIN!

BGR: Well then. I predict 6-10. The Saints & Bucs are just better built teams at this point. Plus, Matt Ryan will likely freeze up once he sees Tom Brady twice each season.

Invigilator: And what, in your words, would be the optimal situational dynamic for the Falcons?

BGR: Unless the NFL is willing to separate the QB salary from the rest of the salary cap, in essence making the QB an excluded position, the best solution for almost any team is to trade the rookie QB before the entry contract expires, and use the bounty of draft picks to obtain another cheaper alternative from the farm system NCAA ranks. Let the Washington or Minnesota teams keep overpaying. Otherwise, they are trapped in a repeating cycle of having to pay lots for little, and build around it for pennies on the dollar.

Invigilator: You said “most teams”. Why not “all teams”.

BGR: Because the Patriots had naughty pictures of Tom Brady. 

Invigilator: Do you have proof or conjecture?

BGR: My proof is the conjecture. Once a cheater, always a cheater. Why else would he have accepted $10 million below standard for all those years? The size of his “home team discount” was obscene, and essentially led to their last three Super Bowls.

Hippo: I FUCKING KNEW IT!

BGR: On that note, this concludes my presentation. If there are no objections, I will take your queries at the nearest bar.

Invigilator: Beerguy, that’s the first accurate thing you’ve said all day! Doctorate granted!